knowledge, and that things are known only so far as our faculties are constituted to attain such knowledge.

True there must always be a relation between the knowing and the known. This must be true of Divine as well as human knowledge. But it does not therefore follow that man's primary and intuitive knowledge is of the relation. In manr cases, it is the knowledge which constitutes the relation, and not the relation wjrfcn is the object of the knowledge.

On the very grounds on which Sir William Hamilton argues so powerfully that our knowledge is original and not inferred, immediate and not through an idea, do we argue that it is positive and not merely phenomenal or relative. No man has shewn so clearly that there are cognitions at first hand—which, as the elements of our mental constitution, " must by us be accepted as true."—(Note A. p. 743 of edit, of Eeid.) But what is meant by accepting them as true ? Surely it is accepting the truth which they certify. But does not the mind in sense-perception hold the object to be a real object ? Does it not hold the same in reference to its knowledge of self by consciousness ? Does it not hold in both these cases that it knows the tiling, and not an appearance, and not a relation between that thing and the mind, and between one thing and another ? If we cannot trust our faculties in this, we can trust them in nothing. " If mendacity be admitted of some of our mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity of any. If one be delusive, so may all:—falsus m uno falsus in omnibus- Absolute scepticism is here the legitimate conclusion."

Speaking not of the relativity of knowledge, but of objects, we are ever noticing relations among different objects, or different parts of the same object. But we know these as relations among objects known. It is because we know things (so much of them) that we know the relations of things. Thus we know body as at one and the same time substance and quality, and can thus cognize the relation between them. We know substance as having power, and can thus trace its relation to its effects. We know the object primarily as in a certain mode, or exercising a certain property, but we would not say that the thing was unknown, because It thus appeared to us, but that it was so far known, as under this mode, or in the exercise of this property.

The result at which we arrive by these speculations is not " nescience," but a limited knowledge, not a " learned ignorance," which may be a very proud ignorance, but a humble learning, grateful for what it knows, but ever awed with the conviction that what it knows is little in comparison of what it does not know, ''and cannot know, in this present world; is but a little sphere of light in the heart of an infinitude of (to man) darkness. Man is, after all, but gathering pebbles by the shore of the ocean of truth, which lies before him unexplored and unexplorablc —still what he gathers are pebbles, and not the mere appearance of pebbles, or pebbles in relation to him. Let us value what we know as trustworthy, but feel, meanwhile, that we dare not dictate and dogmatize as to topics which lie in the un-

knowable region -which surrounds us above and below, before and behind, on the right hand and the left. " The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children."

The most extreme representative of this school is Professor Ferrier, in hie Institutes of Metaphysic. The work professes to be a demonstration, but does not at its commencement announce any definitions nor axioms, to let us know what is assumed, and in what sense. His first proposition is:—"Along with whatever intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself." Does this proposition announce itself as intuitively true ?